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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
-PROBABLE CAUSE-The United States Supreme Court has held
that a search warrant based on information from an anonymous
informant can withstand a constitutional challenge when viewed
by a "totality of the circumstances" approach.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department
received an anonymous, handwritten letter which stated that
Lance Gates and his wife Susan were involved in selling drugs.'
The letter detailed a scheme whereby Susan would drive their car
to Florida to be filled with drugs and then fly back home.' Lance
would then fly to Florida to drive the car filled with drugs back to
Bloomingdale.' The letter set forth the area in which the Gates
resided and noted that the Gates currently had over $100,000
worth of drugs in the house. Bloomingdale's police chief presented
the letter to Detective Mader who was then informed by state au-
thorities that a driver's license had been issued to a Lance Gates
with a Bloomingdale address.$ Mader then contacted a confidential
informant who obtained a recent address.for Gates.6 The detective
1. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1983). The letter in full read:
This is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make their
living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off
Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are done Florida. Sue his
wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then
Lance flys [sic] down and drives it back. Sue flys [sic] back after she drops the car off
in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a
few days to drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk
loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of
drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on
pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are friends
with some big drug dealers, who visit their house often.











also contacted a Chicago police officer at O'Hare Airport who in-
formed Mader that Lance Gates had a reservation on Eastern Air-
lines Flight 245, which was to depart Chicago for West Palm
Beach, Florida on May 5 at 4:15 p.m."
Mader sought the assistance of the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration, an agent of which observed Gates board the Eastern Flight
in Chicago.' Other DEA agents observed Gates land in West Palm
Beach and check into a room at a Holiday Inn registered in the
name of Susan Gates.9 At seven o'clock the next morning the DEA
agent reported that Gates and an unidentified woman left the
motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois plates heading north on the
interstate most often used by travelers to Chicago.' 0 The DEA
agent also informed Mader that the license plate on the Mercury
was registered to Gates, but the plate was registered for another
vehicle."
An affidavit signed by Detective Mader setting forth these facts
and a copy of the anonymous letter were submitted to a judge sit-
ting on the Circuit Court of DuPage County.'2 Based on this infor-
mation, the judge issued a search warrant for both the Gates' resi-
dence and the automobile they were driving.' 3 Early on the
morning of March 7, Susan and Lance Gates returned home where
Bloomingdale Police had been waiting."' A search of their automo-
bile produced almost 350 pounds of marijuana and a search of the
house uncovered more marijuana, weapons, and other
contraband.'8
Prior to trial, the Gates filed a pretrial motion to quash the
search warrant and suppress all evidence seized.' 6 Relying on Agui-
lar v. Texas,'7 the Gates argued that the letter did not set forth
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2325-26.
10. Id. at 2326.
11. Id. The DEA agent also informed Detective Mader that it took approximately 22
to 24 hours to drive from West Palm Beach to Bloomingdale, a suburb of Chicago. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Approximately 36 hours had lapsed from the time Lance Gates boarded the
plane to Florida and his return home. Id.
15. Id.
16. See People v. Gates, 82 Ill. -App. 3d 749, 752, 403 N.E.2d 77, 80 (1980).
17. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). In Aguilar, a search warrant was held to be invalid because
the magistrate was not informed of some of the underlying circumstances which justified the
affiant's belief that the informant was a credible person or that his information was reliable.
The affiant gave no information about the informant but acquired a search warrant based
on an affidavit which stated:
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the reliability of the author nor was there a showing that the au-
thor received his information in a reliable manner.18 After a hear-
ing, the trial court granted the motion and on appeal the Illinois
Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.' 9
The Illinois Appellate Court based its reasoning on Aguilar's two
pronged test and Spinelli v. United States,0 which further ex-
plained Aguilar."' The court stated that the affidavit for the search
warrant did not reveal the manner in which the anonymous in-
formant had obtained his information and there was insufficient
detail in the letter to allow the issuing magistrate to infer that the
informer had obtained his information in a reliable way, thus fail-
ing the basis of knowledge prong of the test.2 2 As to the other part
of the test, the court noted that partial corroboration, as was evi-
dent, only satisfies the veracity prong and does not establish the
basis of knowledge prong, therefore the requirements of Aguilar
and Spinelli were not met.
28
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts in hold-
ing that the magistrate did not have sufficient information on
"Affliants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that
heroin. . . and other narcotics. .. are being kept at the above described premises for the
sole purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of law." Id. at 109.
Aguilar has come to be understood as establishing a two-pronged test used to verify the
validity of an informant's tip. The first prong, the basis of knowledge prong, is concerned
with where or how the informant came about his information; the second deals with the
veracity or credibility of the informant, or with the reliability of his information. Id. See,
e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
18. 82 Ill. App. 3d at 752-53, 403 N.E.2d at 80.
19. 103 S. Ct. at 2326. See 82 III. App. 3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980); 85 M11. 2d 376, 423
N.E.2d 887 (1981).
20. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). In Spinelli the affidavit submitted to obtain a warrant stated
that the FBI had watched Spinelli for five days and that he was observed crossing the bor-
der between Illinois and St. Louis, Missouri. The affidavit also stated that an FBI agent had
checked with the telephone company and found that the apartment Spinelli had visited was
equipped with two telephones with different numbers. The application for the warrant
stated that Spinelli was known to the affliant and law enforcement agencies as a bookmaker
and a gambler. Finally the affidavit stated the FBI "has been informed by a confidential
reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and
disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones .. " Id. at 414.
The Supreme Court held that the warrant did not fulfill the requirements set forth in
Aguilar but stated that, in the absence of a statement by the informant setting forth his
basis of knowledge, sufficient detail within the confidential informant's tip itself may satisfy
the requirements. The Court reasoned that sufficient detail is important when the magis-
trate is basing his determinations of probable cause on information supplied by a confiden-
tial informant so the magistrate knows he is basing his determinations on something more
than a casual rumor or the general reputation of the suspect. Id. at 416.
21. People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 754, 403 N.E.2d 77, 81 (1980).
22. Id. at 753-54, 403 N.E.2d at 80.
23. Id. at 754, 403 N.E.2d at 81.
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which to issue a search warrant."' The Illinois Supreme Court re-
ferred to both the fourth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution 6 and article 1, section 6 of the Constitution of Illinois26 as
providing assurances against unreasonable searches and seizures.'s
According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the Aguilar test was the
proper test applicable to anonymous tips under these constitu-
tional provisions.' The court concluded that there was no basis of
knowledge established in the tip, nor was there information to con-
clude that the informant was credible or his information reliable.29
The court also considered the concept set forth in Spinelli, of self
verifying detail in connection with corroborative evidence supplied
by the police.,30 The court concluded that the corroboration of in-
nocent activity, coupled with the detail of the anonymous letter,
was insufficient for a finding of probable cause under the Aguilar
tests.3'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the magistrate's issuance of the search warrant on the ba-
sis of a partially corroborated anonymous tip violated the fourth
amendment.3' After oral argument, the Court requested the parties
to address the question of whether the exclusionary rule should be
modified so as not to exclude evidence which is obtained in a rea-
sonable belief that the search and seizure is consistent with the
Constitution and then scheduled the case for reargument. 5 After
24. See People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981).
25. U. S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
26. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I, section 6 provides:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or in-
terceptions of communication by eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant
shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
27. 85 II. 2d at 381-82, 423 N.E.2d at 889.
28. Id. at 382, 423 N.E.2d at 890.
29. Id. at 384-86, 423 N.E.2d at 890-91.
30. Id. at 388, 423 N.E.2d at 891-92.
31. Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
32. 103 S. Ct. at 2321.
33. Id. The exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence which has been obtained in
violation of the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
1048 Vol. 22:1045
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reargument, however, the Court retreated and announced that
since the issue had not been addressed or presented in the Illinois
courts, it would be improper for the Court to make a decision on
the exclusionary rule."
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 5 agreed with the Il-
linois Supreme Court's conclusion that the anonymous letter,
standing alone, would not supply a magistrate with enough infor-
mation for a determination of probable cause." He also agreed
with the lower court that an informant's veracity, reliability and
basis of knowledge are highly relevant in determining the value of
the informant's tip.37 Justice Rehnquist did not agree, however,
that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and
independent requirements of Aguilar that are to be rigidly applied
to every case where an anonymous informant's tip is to be used."
Instead, he stated that these requirements should be understood as
closely intertwined issues which determine probable cause in a
common sense and practical manner and thus adopted an ap-
proach that took into account all the indicia involved: a "totality of
the circumstances" approach."9
The Court, after a brief discussion of the history of probable
cause, agreed with previous decisions of the Court in that it is
quite proper to issue search warrants based on nontechnical, com-
mon sense judgments of laymen.40 The Court stated that when a
court reviews a magistrate's determination of probable cause a trial
de novo should not be held.41 According to the Court, an overscru-
tinizing or grudging review toward warrants is inconsistent with
the fourth amendment's preference for searches conducted pursu-
ant to a search warrant and courts should not invalidate warrants
based on a hypertechnical rather than a common sense review. '
34. 103 S. Ct. at 2321. As Justice Rehnquist regretfully stated, "[w]e decide today,
with apologies to all, that the issue we framed for the parties was not presented to the
Illinois courts and, accordingly, do not address it." Id.
35. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Powell. Justice White filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Brennan
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall joined, and Justice Stevens filed a dis-
senting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. 103 S. Ct. at 2317.
36. 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
37. Id. at 2327.
38. Id. at 2327-28. See 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981).
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2328.
40. Id. at 2330-31. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Stanley v.
State, 19 Md. App. 507, 313 A.2d 847 (1974).
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2331.
42. Id.
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The Court stated that the informant's veracity or reliability and
his basis of knowledge are better understood as relevant considera-
tions in the totality of the circumstances analysis than are these
tests when applied separately.4" Under a totality approach, a defi-
ciency in one area can be overcome by a strong showing in the
other." According to the Court, the two-pronged test has en-
couraged overtechnical dissection of an informant's tip with undue
attention being given to satisfying each prong separately; thus a
totality approach should be used which would permit a balancing
of the relative weights of all various indicia of reliability surround-
ing the tip.
45
Noting Jones v. United States4" and United States v. Harris,
47
Justice Rehnquist said the traditional standards for review of a
magistrate's issuance of a search warrant have been whether there
is a substantial basis for believing a search would uncover evidence
of wrongdoing. 4 He also reasoned that subjecting warrants to se-
vere scrutiny on review, as some courts have done, encourages po-
lice to resort to warrantless searches in hope that in some man-
ner-either through consent of those searched or some other
exception to the warrant requirement-the search will be vali-
dated.49 Justice Rehnquist believed that the substantial basis stan-
dard for a search warrant is a better test of probable cause than
the two-pronged test in Aguilar and Spinelli because it is more
consistent with the traditional deference to the probable cause de-
43. Id. at 2329.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2330.
46. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones, the Court upheld a search warrant based on an
affidavit of a narcotics agent, Officer Didone, who claimed to have no direct knowledge of
the presence of narcotics in the apartment. Didone swore that the day before making the
affidavit he received information that petitioner and another kept narcotics at the apart-
ment. He swore that the informant claimed to have purchased narcotics on many occasions
at the apartment. Didone also swore the informant had given information in the past which
had been correct and that the same information given Didone had been given by other in-
formants. Id. at 268-69.
47. 403 U.S. 573 (1971). The Harris Court upheld a conviction based on an affidavit
which stated that Harris had a reputation of being a trafficker in non-tax-paid liquor, and
that the afflant received information about Harris' reputation from all types of persons. The
affidavit also stated that a stash of non-tax-paid liquor was found in an abandoned house
under the control of Harris and that the afflant had information from a confidential inform-
ant, who feared for his life if his name be used, and who, for more than two years, had
purchased liquor from Harris. Id. at 575-76.




termination of magistrates. 50
The Court maintained that the decisions following Spinelli
poorly serve the government's function of protecting the security
of the individual and his property because the strictures of the
two-pronged test cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law
enforcement. 51 Anonymous tips would seldom survive an applica-
tion of either prong of the test, the Court submitted.52 The Court
reasoned that an ordinary citizen, much like an ordinary witness,
would not be able to meet the strict requirements of the two-
pronged test because citizens do not often give extensive details of
their observation, and thus they would not fulfill the basis of
knowledge prong or the veracity prong of the test."
The Court also said that when dealing with anonymous infor-
mants, it is almost impossible to fulfill the veracity prong because
there is no way of knowing if the informant is reliable or credible."
Because of the difficulty in applying the test to anonymous tips,
such tips would be rendered useless in police work if each prong
were applied separately and rigidly." The Court agreed that such
tips, especially when corroborated by independent police work, are
useful, that some sort of assessment should still be used for the
crediting of anonymous tips and further that an assessment which
would render these tips useless is not required by the fourth
amendment.'
Justice Rehnquist stated that the better course would be to
abandon the Aguilar and Spinelli two-pronged test and adopt the
totality of the circumstances approach which was traditionally
used as the basis of probable cause, citing Jones v. United
States,7 United States v. Ventresca,8 and Brinegar v. United
50. Id. Similarly, the Court reiterated the concept that when police officers conduct an
arrest or search with a warrant in hand, the public's perception as to the lawfulness of the
act is greatly increased because it assures the individual of the lawful authority of that
officer's actions and the restriction placed upon him. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2332.
53. Id. at 2331.
54. Id. at 2331-32.
55. Id. at 2331.
56. Id. at 2332. The Court stated: "[s]uch tips, particularly when supplemented by
independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise 'perfect
crimes.' While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is required by
the Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen
informants is not." Id.
57. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See supra note 46 and accompanying test.
58. 380 U.S. 102 (1965). The Ventresca Court upheld an affidavit for a search warrant
although the affidavit did not specifically state which alcohol and tobacco investigators ob-
1984 1051
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States.8' A magistrate, said Justice Rehnquist, when deciding on
whether probable cause exists, should make a practical common
sense decision given all the circumstances, including the veracity
and basis of knowledge of the informant. 60 He believed that a flex-
ible, more easily applied standard, would better accommodate the
fourth amendment requirements than the test announced in Agui-
lar and Spinelli.1
Reviewing earlier cases which involved the validity of search
warrants and anonymous tips, the Court noted Nathanson v.
United States6' and Aguilar and stated that even under a totality
of the circumstances approach the search warrants in those two
cases would have been invalid in that they were based solely on
conclusions of the informant and no facts concerning the reliabil-
ity, credibility, or basis of knowledge of the informant were given. 63
The Court believed, however, that the fourth amendment probable
cause requirement does not lend itself to a particular set of rules
and is much better served by the common sense standards previ-
ously set forth in Ventresca, Jones and Brinegar.
64
Justice Rehnquist, answering Justice Brennan's dissent, said the
majority's decision would not downgrade the role of the neutral
magistrate as Justice Brennan feared, but would do just the con-
trary because the magistrate would be free to draw reasonable in-
ferences from the material given to him by the search warrant's
served the activity under investigation. The Court based its decision on the grounds that
there was substantial basis for crediting the affidavit. Id. at 109-11. See infra notes 124-128
and accompanying text.
59. 338 U.S. 160 (1949). In Brinegar the Court upheld the conviction where the arrest-
ing officer had arrested petitioner five months earlier, knew the reputation of the petitioner
as a trafficker in illegal liquor, possessed hearsay information concerning the general reputa-
tion of the petitioner, personally observed suspicious activity, and upon confronting Brine-
gar found twelve cases of liquor in Brinegar's automobile. Id. at 162-63.
60. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
61. Id.
62. 290 U.S. 41 (1933). In Nathanson, the Court held violative of the fourth amend-
ment a search warrant based solely on the conclusions of a suspecting police officer. The
affidavit stated:
Whereas said Francis B. Laughlin has stated under his oath that he has cause to
suspect and does believe that certain merchandise, to wit: Certain liquors of foreign
origin a more particular description of which cannot be given, upon which the duties
have not been paid, or which otherwise been brought into the United States contrary
to law, and that said merchandise is now deposited and contained within the prem-
ises of J.J. Nathanson ...
Id. at 44.
63. 103 S. Ct. at 2332-33.
64. See Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965), supra note 58; Jones, 362 U.S. 257 (1960),
supra note 57; Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160 (1948), supra note 59.
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applicants."' Justice Rehnquist wrote that the magistrate has more
discretion under the totality of the circumstances approach than
under the test established through Aguilar and Spinelli.6 Justice
Rehnquist also addressed Justice Brennan's argument that the
magistrate should be restricted on his determinations of probable
cause by the confines of Aguilar and Spinelli to insure that tips
are obtained by reliable and credible people; Justice Rehnquist
submitted that a magistrate, under the totality standard, is per-
fectly free to extract whatever assurances he feels are necessary
from the informant or the applicant whenever making a determi-
nation of probable cause." Finally, Justice Rehnquist responded to
Justice Brennan's concern over the majority's use of the terms
"practical," "nontechnical," and "common sense," which Justice
Brennan perceived as indicative of an overly permissive expansion
of police powers in derogation of the fourth amendment."8 Justice
Rehnquist replied that loyalty to the Constitution is not achieved
by upholding bizarre claims of individual rights or accepting the
most restrictive claims of government. 9
Concluding that the totality of the circumstances is the proper
test for probable cause, the Court next compared the present case
with Draper v. United States,7 0 a classic decision involving the
value of corroborative efforts by police. The Court surmised that
the showing of probable cause was as compelling in the instant
case as it was in Draper.7 1 The evidence in Draper, as in Gates,
was corroborated by independent police investigation of substan-
tially all of the informant's tip.72 While the informant in Draper
was known and reliable, the anonymous informant's honesty and
reliability were unknown to the police in Gates; but the indepen-
dent police corroboration of the facts given by the information in
Gates, Justice Rehnquist stated, rendered the distinction less sig-
nificant because an informant who is right about some things is





70. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In Draper, the Court held that there was probable cause for
an arrest based on information from a known informant who told police Draper would be
arriving in Denver from Chicago carrying heroin. The informant gave a description of
Draper, including the clothes he would be wearing, the type. of bag he would be carrying,
and the way he would be walking. All of this was corroborated by law enforcement officials.
Id. at 309.




likely to be right about others.73
In conclusion, the majority maintained that while the inform-
ant's information regarding the Gates' travel plans may not have
set forth the basis of knowledge of the anonymous informant, it is
sufficient that there was a fair probability that the writer had ob-
tained the information from Susan or Lance Gates or someone
they trusted.7 ' Corroboration of significant portions of the letter
provided just that probability, according to Justice Rehnquist.78
Thus, he concluded, the magistrate had a substantial basis for hav-
ing determined that probable cause existed to search the Gates'
residence and automobile.
7 6
Justice White, concurring, believed that the Court should have
addressed the issue of the modification of the exclusionary rule.
77
After expressing his dissatisfaction with the rule, Justice White
stated that the Court should create a good faith exception.
7 8 Jus-
tice White stated, however, that if the Court were to formulate a
good faith exception, the Illinois Supreme Court would be free to
decide if a good faith exception is consistent with the Illinois
791Constitution.
According to Justice White, the Court does not follow its own
prudential advice.80 He stated that the Illinois Supreme Court
found not only a violation of the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution but also a violation of article 1, section 6 of the
Illinois Constitution.s" If the Court is to be consistent, Justice
White stated, the Illinois courts should be given the opportunity to
consider whether a totality of the circumstances test should re-
place the more precise rules of Aguilar and Spinelli.
8 2
Justice White, addressing the issue with which the majority
73. Id. at 2335. Justice Rehnquist seemed to over-emphasize the value of the corrobo-
ration in order to compensate for a lack of reliability in the informant when comparing the
present case to Draper. Id.
74. Id. at 2336.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (White, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 2339 (White, J., concurring).
79. Id. Justice White averred that although the Court was free to consider changes in
the Aguilar-Spinelli test under the Federal Constitution, only the Illinois Supreme Court
could consider changes in that test applicable to Illinois law under the Illinois Constitution.
According to Justice White, the Illinois Supreme Court was not clear on which constitution
it relied upon in invalidating the search, and thus, if that court relied on the Illinois Consti-






dealt, stated that the fact the anonymous tip was corroborated by
the actions of the suspects, whether innocent or not, gives rise to
the inference that the informant is credible and that he acquired
the information in a reliable manner.s He thought that the police
investigation alone established the inference that the tip was trust-
worthy and that this alone would satisfy the Aguilar test." Justice
White believed it was not necessary to abandon the Aguilar-
Spinelli test, but that a proper application of that test would have
led to the same result as that reached by the majority."5 Justice
White expressed his reluctance to approve any standard that does
not require some showing of facts that support an inference that
the informant is credible and that the information is obtained in a
reliable manner before a search warrant is issued.86
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissenting, stated
that findings of probable cause and the issuance of a search war-
rant should not be authorized unless there is some assurance that
the information relied upon has been obtained in an honest or
credible manner.87 Justice Brennan stated that by requiring police
to provide certain crucial information to magistrates and by struc-
turing magistrates' probable cause inquiries, Aguilar and Spinelli
had assured the magistrate's role as an independent arbitrator of
probable cause and guaranteed greater accuracy in probable cause
determinations. 8
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, dissenting, focused
on the anonymous letter and the facts known to Detective Ma-
der.' 9 The discrepancies were important, according to Justice Ste-
vens, because they cast doubt on whether the Gates had $100,000
worth of drugs in their home.90 The letter, he noted, indicated a
pattern of travel that would leave one spouse at home at all times,
presumably to protect the remaining drugs; but he believed the in-
ference failed once the pair were observed together away from
83. Id. at 2348 (White, J., concurring). Justice White also compared Gates to Draper
(see supra note 70) in evaluating the weight to be accorded corroboration on seemingly
innocent activity. Id. at 2348-49 (White, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 2349 (White, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2355 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Stevens'
dissent that even under a totality of the circumstances approach the search warrant was
invalid. Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




their home.9 ' According to Justice Stevens, this discrepancy made
the Gates' conduct seem substantially less unusual than the in-
formant had predicted when the informant wrote that Susan would
return home and then Lance would fly to Florida when in fact the
couple only spent the night in the Holiday Inn and then drove
back together.92 Justice Stevens stated that the fact that the anon-
ymous letter contained a material mistake undermined the reason-
ableness of relying on it as a basis for a search of the home. 93 He
concluded that the Court's evaluation of the search warrant was
tainted by subsequent events, that there was no probable cause to
search the home at the time the warrant was issued, and that the
case should be remanded for a decision as to the validity of the car
search in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Ross.9" Under Ross, Justice Stevens suggested, the validity of the
search would be upheld if there was probable cause to search after
the Gates had arrived home.9"
The fourth amendment guarantees to the people the right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, and provides that a warrant shall
not be issued unless based upon probable cause supported by oath
or affirmation.9 The amendment was intended to put an end to
the search and seizure abuses of the colonial days when writs of
assistance and public warrants empowered revenue agents to con-
duct searches at their discretion.97
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court adopted the exclu-
sionary rule in Weeks v. United States," stating that the fourth
amendment barred the use, in federal prosecutions, of evidence
which was obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure."
Thirty-five years later, in Wolf v. Colorado,'"0 the Court refused to
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Justice Stevens also thought deference should be given to the lower courts de-
terminations as to reliability of the information in that these determinations should at least
be given a presumption of accuracy. Id. at 2362 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2361 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982). Ross involved the warrantless search of an automobile. The Court upheld a search of
containers inside the automobile where there was probable cause to search only the vehicle.
Id. at 825.
95. 103 S. Ct. at 2361.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See supra note 25.
97. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-27 (1886).
98. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
99. Id. at 398.
100. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
1056 Vol. 22:1045
Recent Decisions
apply the rule to unreasonable searches and seizures in a state
prosecution.'"1 In 1961, however, in Mapp v. Ohio,0 2 the Court re-
versed its position, holding that illegally seized evidence is inad-
missible even in a state prosecution. 03
The language of the fourth amendment seems to indicate that an
arrest or search may only be effected with a warrant. Nonetheless,
there are circumstances in which the police are permitted to make
arrests and searches without first obtaining a warrant.'" The
courts, however, have historically favored warranted actions over
warrantless actions in order to provide the police with an incentive
to procure a warrant, for, if the requirements for warrantless ac-
tions are less stringent than warranted actions, the police would
have little inducement to obtain a judicially approved warrant
before acting upon a search or an arrest. 0 5
Probable cause deals with probabilities, and proof of the ac-
cused's guilt is not needed. Probable cause, however, is based on
more than mere suspicion.'"s Probable cause exists where the facts
and circumstances within the officer's-knowledge, and of which he
had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient for a man of
reasonable caution to believe an offense has been committed.1
0 7
The determination of probable cause is based upon nontechnical
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not technicians, act. 08
A warrant must be issued by a magistrate who is neutral, de-
tached, and capable of determining whether probable cause exists
for the requested arrest or search. 09 If a magistrate is not neutral
101. Id. at 33.
102. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
103. Id. at 655.
104. See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuREs: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 4.1, at 3 (1978). See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (upholding warrantless
search of an automobile); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (validating warrantless
search of the area in the immediate control of the defendant incident to a lawful arrest). See
generally Annot., 19 A.L.R. 3d 727 (1968).
105. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963). In Wong Sun the Court
held that the defendant's conviction for transportation and concealment of heroin was inva-
lid because the sources of information upon which the arrest were made were too vague and
untested to determine probable cause. Id.
106. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173-75 (1949).
107. Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
108. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175.
109. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972). In Shadwick the Court
upheld a city charter provision which authorized municipal court clerks to issue arrest war-
rants for municipal ordinance violations, finding that the clerks were capable of making
probable cause determinations for such ordinances and were neutral and detached. Id.
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and detached the warrant is invalidated as a violation of both the
fourth and fourteenth amendments. 1 0
Within the area of warranted and warrantless actions for both
arrests and searches, the United States Supreme Court has strug-
gled for years to espouse a manageable, applicable standard on
which to credit hearsay information in determining probable
cause.1" ' The Court has said that hearsay may be the basis for a
determination of probable cause, as long as there is a substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay." 2 Applications for warrants based
on hearsay usually emanate from information given by named but
confidential informants, unnamed confidential informants, or
anonymous informants." 3
The Supreme Court has not dealt with informant cases in a con-
sistent or clear fashion, thus it is not surprising that a majority of
probable cause issues raised in appellate courts concern informa-
tion obtained from informants."" The Court has applied the same
standards to assess the credibility of information whether obtained
by named, unnamed, or anonymous informants." 5 While the Court
had not squarely confronted the issue of anonymous informants
before Gates, it had previously addressed the problems of named
and unnamed informants." 6 Two cases which deal primarily with
known or named informants are Draper v. United States"7 and
110. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971). The Court found that a
state attorney general was not neutral and detached because he was the chief government
enforcement agent of the state. The state attorney general in this case was also in charge of
the investigation and acted as prosecutor at trial. Id. at 450.
111. See, e.g., Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932). In Grau the Court con-
cluded that hearsay evidence cannot provide the probable cause necessary for the issuance
of a search warrant. The Court stated that a warrant will issue only upon evidence which
would be competent at trial of the offense before a jury. Id. at 128. But see Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In Jones the Court specifically stated that hearsay can be the
basis of probable cause. Id. at 271. See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-73
(1949) (rejecting the contention that only evidence which would be admissible at a trial is
permitted when determining probable cause for a search warrant).
112. See Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964), infra notes 137-140 and
accompanying text; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), infra notes 133-136 and
accompanying text.
113. 1 J. VARON, SEARCH, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 352 (2d ed. 1974).
114. See LaFave, supra note 104, § 3.3, at 500.
115. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); infra notes 116-123 and accom-
panying text; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965), infra notes 124-128 and ac-
companying text.
116. See, e.g., Draper, 358 U.S. 307 (where informant was named and had a past repu-
tation of being accurate); Aguilar, 378 U.S. 108 (where the informant was unnamed); Gates,
103 S. Ct. 2317 (where the informant was anonymous).
117. 358 U.S. 307 (1958). See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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United States v. Ventresca."18
In Draper, the Court upheld an arrest without a warrant based
on information obtained from an informant, Hereford, who was a
special employee of the Bureau of Narcotics in Denver. 19 Hereford
told Denver narcotics agents that Draper was selling narcotics and
that Draper had gone to Chicago and was to return to Denver by
train with heroin.1 20 Hereford also gave a detailed description of
Draper, including the clothing he would be wearing upon his re-
turn, the type of bag he would be carrying and the way he would
be walking. '2 Hereford had been reliable in the past, and after the
facts which Hereford stated were verified by police observation,
Draper was arrested and searched,. whereupon the police found two
envelopes containing heroin.122 The Draper Court found that
under the facts and circumstances of the case, the police had rea-
sonable grounds to believe that Draper was violating the applicable
drug laws, and therefore, the arrest and subsequent search were
valid.
128
Ventresca concerned the validity of a search warrant which was
based upon an affidavit containing information of the affiant and
other Alcohol and Tobacco Division investigators who were not
specifically named in the affidavit. 2 4 The Supreme Court overruled
the court of appeals, which had held that the warrant was insuffi-
cient because the affidavit did not specifically state that the infor-
mation it contained was based upon personal knowledge of the affi-
ant or that the information gathered by other investigators was not
based on hearsay from unreliable informants. 25 Justice Goldberg
wrote that such warrants must be tested and interpreted by magis-
118. 380 U.S. 102 (1965). See infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
119. 358 U.S. at 309.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 309-10.
123. Id. at 314.
124. 380 U.S. 102 (1965). The affidavit contained a lengthy description of observed
activity of Ventresca and his home, including sounds and smells emanating from the house
that led investigators to conclude that Ventresca was distilling spirits. The affidavit was
prefaced:
Based upon observation made by me, and based upon information received offi-
cially from other investigators attached to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division as-
signed to this investigation, and reports orally made to me describing the results of
their observation and investigation, this request for the issuance of a search warrant
is made.
Id. at 103-04.
125. Id. at 104-05.
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trates and courts in a common sense and realistic fashion. 26 He
stated that where the circumstances are detailed, where there is
reason for crediting the source of information, and where a magis-
trate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate
the'warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical,
rather than a practical, manner. 2 7 Thus, the Ventresca Court up-
held the search warrant and gave validity to the affidavit, even
though all the sources of the information were not specifically
named.
128
In the area of unnamed confidential informants a suitable start-
ing point for analysis is the Supreme Court's decision in Gior-
denello v. United States,' 9 where the defendant was accused of
unlawful possession of narcotics and an arrest warrant was issued
based on the affidavit of a federal narcotics agent.130 It appeared
from testimony given at the suppression hearing that the affiant
received his information from other law enforcement officers and
other persons in Houston, none of whom appeared before the com-
missioner or signed affidavits in support of the arrest warrant.131
The Court found that the warrant was invalid because the com-
plaint contained no affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke
with personal knowledge and it did not indicate any sources of the
affiant's belief.13 2
Four years later in Jones v. United States,1 33 the Court upheld a
search warrant based on an affidavit consisting mostly of hearsay
information from an unnamed informant; the Court found a sub-
stantial basis for crediting the hearsay.13 4 The affidavit stated that
a Detective Didone had been given information by an unnamed
informant who was proven reliable in the past, that the suspect
126. Id. at 108.
127. Id. at 109.
128. Id. at 110.
129. 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
130. Id. at 481. The arrest warrant was based on the following affidavit:
The undersigned complainant [Finley) being duly sworn states: That on or about
January 26, 1956, at Houston Texas ...Veto Giorenello did receive, conceal, etc.,
narcotic drugs, . . . with knowledge of unlawful importation; in violation of Section
174, Title 21, United States Code. And the complainant states further that he be-
lieves that are material witnesses in relation to
this charge.
Id.
131. Id. at 485.
132. Id. at 486.




and another were involved in drug trafficking, that they kept a
ready supply of heroin on hand and that the informant had pur-
chased drugs at the suspect's apartment on many occasions. 13 5 Jus-
tice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, concluded that hearsay
may be the basis for a warrant, and because the informant had
been proven reliable in the past, his tip had been corroborated by
other sources of information and the defendant was known by the
police to be a user of narcotics, there was a substantial basis for a
magistrate to conclude that narcotics were probably present in the
apartment. 13 6
Rugendorf v. United States13 7 was the next important case the
Supreme Court heard concerning the credibility of hearsay from an
unnamed informant. The informant, who had furnished reliable in-
formation in the past, told police that in the previous week he had
seen seventy-five to eighty mink, otter and beaver stoles and jack-
ets in the home of Samuel Rugendorf, that the labels had been
removed and that he was told the stoles had been stolen.3 8 The
police verified the description of the furs and, based upon the po-
lice verification and the informant's information, a search warrant
was obtained."'B The Court stated that there was a substantial ba-
sis for the Commissioner to conclude that the stolen furs were
probably in petitioner's basement given the detail of the informa-
tion provided by the informant and the corroboration of that infor-
mation by the police.1
40
During the same term, the Court handed down the landmark de-
cision in Aguilar v. Texas,14 ' declaring that although a search war-
rant may be based on hearsay, the administering magistrate must
be informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied upon
by the person providing the information and informed of some of
135. Id. at 268.
136. Id. at 271.
137. 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
138. Id. at 530. Another confidential informant, who had also proven reliable, told an
FBI agent that Leo Rugendorf was a fence and that Samuel and Leo were brothers and both
were associated in the meat business. The Court found factual inaccuracies in the inform-
ant's tip in that an allegation was made that Samuel Rugendorf was the manager of
Rugendorf Brothers Meat Market and that he was associated with his brother Leo in the
meat business-when in actuality Samuel had terminated his association with his brother in
the meat business in 1952. The Court stated that such inaccuracies were only of peripheral
relevancy to the showing of probable cause and did not go to the integrity of the affidavit.
Id. at 532.
139. Id. at 531.
140. Id. at 532-33.
141. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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the underlying circumstances upon which the affiant concluded
that the informant was credible or his information reliable." ' The
affidavit in support of the search warrant in Aguilar merely stated
that the affiants had received information from a credible person
and that the affiants believed that there was heroin at the defen-
dant's residence.1 4 The facts of the case indicate that there was no
police corroboration of the tip or any detail given about how the
informant learned the information, thus, the warrant was issued
only on the mere conclusions of the informant.14 4 Writing for the
majority, Justice Goldberg stated that there was an insufficient ba-
sis of probable cause since the magistrate was not informed of how
the informant came about his information or whether the unnamed
informant was credible or his information reliable. 14
In 1969 the Court granted certiorari in SpineUi v. United
States 46 to further clarify the requirements espoused in Aguilar.
The affidavit in support of the Spinelli search warrant stated that
the FBI had kept Spinelli under surveillance for five days and on
four of these days he had been seen leaving Illinois and going to an
apartment in St. Louis, that the apartment had two telephones
with different numbers, that Spinelli was known to the affiant and
other law enforcement agents as a bookmaker, and that the FBI
had been informed by a confidential, reliable informant that
Spinelli was operating a bookmaking operation. 4 7 According to the
majority, the commissioner could not credit the informant's tip
without abdicating his constitutional function. 48 In holding that
the affidavit fell short of the standards set forth in Aguilar, the
Spinelli Court said that the tip did not contain a sufficient state-
ment of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
could conclude Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation, the
affiant did not set forth any reason why he felt his informant was
reliable, and the informant's information was not sufficiently de-
tailed to give reliability to the tip. 4 9 The Court also stated that
142. Id. at 114.
143. Id. at 109. See supra note 17.
144. See 378 U.S. at 113-14. Corroboration was found to be determinitive in Draper.
See supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text. In Jones, the Court stated that a very
important factor in the affidavit is that the afliant set forth the credibility of the informant.
362 U.S. at 271. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
145. 378 U.S. at 114-16.
146. 393 U.S. 410, 412 (1969). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 413-14.
148. Id. at 416.
149. Id. at 416-19. The Court stated:
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corroboration of the information cannot support the inference that
the informant was generally trustworthy or reliable.' 50
The Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test was thus the standard by
which the constitutional validity of search warrants had been
tested when such warrants were based upon hearsay." The first
part of the test concerned the basis of knowledge of the inform-
ant's information; the second part dealt with the credibility of the
informant and the reliability of his information.1 52 Spinelli inti-
mated that a deficiency in one of these prongs could be cured by a
tip which was sufficiently detailed.8 3 Justice Harlan, the author of
the Spinelli opinion, flatly refused to adopt a totality of the cir-
cumstances approach, stating that such an approach would sweep
too broadly in the area of probable cause.15 4 United States v. Har-
ris1"55 was decided two years after Spinelli and it, too, concerned
the weight to be accorded statements made by unnamed infor-
mants."' The search warrant in Harris was based on an affidavit
which stated that Harris had a reputation for being a trafficker in
non-tax-paid liquor and that liquor had been found in a shack
which had been under Harris' control.17 In upholding the warrant
the Court said that Aguilar could not be read as having questioned
the validity of the more readily applied substantial basis standard
for determining probable cause; therefore, there could be no basis
whatsoever for finding the affidavit wanting. 58 The Harris Court
gave considerable weight to the affidavit because the affiant had
In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was
gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activ-
ity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something
more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation
based merely on an individual's general reputation.
Id. at 416.
150. Id. at 417.
151. Id. at 415-16.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 416.
154. Id. at 415. Justice Harlan wrote: "We believe, however, that the 'totality of cir-
cumstances' approach taken by the Court of Appeals paints with too broad a brush. Where,
as here, the informer's tip is a necessary element in a finding of probable cause, its proper
weight must be determined by a more precise analysis." Id.
155. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
156. Id. at 575-76.
157. Id. The afflant further stated that he had received information from a reliable
informant who feared for his life if he were identified, but that the informant was a prudent
person who had previously bought liquor from Harris, and the affiant knew others who had
purchased non-tax-paid liquor from Harris. Id.
158. Id. at 581.
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set forth his own personal knowledge of the suspect's reputation,
that the information obtained from the informant had set forth the
informant's basis of knowledge, and that the informant in giving
such information had gone against his penal interest by having im-
plicated himself in the illegal sale of liquor.
159
While the Supreme Court had decided cases concerning named
and unnamed informants before Gates, the lower courts had strug-
gled to formulate a standard for evaluating anonymous tips.160
Three recent pre-Gates decisions dealing with anonymous tips
based the credibility of these tips on an Aguilar-Spinelli standard.
In United States v. Rasor,16' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that if the anonymous tip fulfilled the requirements of
Aguilar-Spinelli, the tip by itself could establish probable cause.1 62
The Rasor court stated that if the tip fails such a test, the search
warrant can properly issue if the tip is sufficiently corroborated."'
In 1981, however, in United States v. Hirschhorn,6" the same
court stated that a hearsay tip from an anonymous informant can-
not alone furnish probable cause for a search warrant since it lacks
the basic criteria to judge both the reliability of the informant and
the reliability of the information furnished by him. 6" Although
otherwise inconsistent with its previous decision in Rasor, the
Hirschhorn court did recognize that a tip of unknown reliability
can be shown to be reliable through police corroboration. 66
United States v. Zucco, 1  decided by the Second Circuit Court
159. Id. at 581-83.
160. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330 n.9.
161. 599 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1979). The court held that the affidavit was insufficient in
support of a search warrant where an anonymous informant had informed police that a
motor home contained marijuana and was parked at a specific location. The informant gave
no underlying circumstances on which the tip was based. While under police surveillance,
the motor home was moved and the driver recognized as one previously arrested for posses-
sion of heroin. Based on this information the police were able to obtain a search warrant. Id.
at 1331.
162. Id. at 1332.
163. Id.
164. 649 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981). Hirschhorn was convicted for failure to file a wager-
ing tax return. Three search warrants were issued based on an affidavit which summarized
information received from informants and surveillance concerning gambling activities con-
ducted by four individuals. Id. at 362.
165. Id. at 363.
166. 649 F.2d at 363.
167. 694 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1982). In Zucco an anonymous informant called the police,
stating he had seen a man place several pistols in the wheel well of a station wagon. The
informant described the car, told the police where it was parked, and said that the station
wagon was pulling a black truck and a black wooden camper. This informant also said that
the defendant had three submachine guns and was responsible for bombings and threats in
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of Appeals, gave credibility to an anonymous tip when the inform-
ant stated that he had seen the suspected activity himself and the
tip had been sufficiently detailed and corroborated by the police.'"
The court, however, refused to accept the government's argument
that anonymous tips are inherently credible, noting there was no
evidence in the affidavit from which it could be inferred that the
informants were without motive to lie.169
To clarify the standards applicable in the named, unnamed and
anonymous informant cases, the Gates Court adopted the totality
of the circumstances approach and abandoned the often contorted
standard of Aguilar-Spinelli.70 The Gates Court said that when
determining probable cause under the totality approach, consider-
ation should be given to all indicia of reliability, including the ba-
sis of knowledge of the informant, the informant's past accuracy,
the informant's reputation, the detail of the informant's tip, police
corroboration of the tip and the reputation of the suspect. 1
Two recent decisions interpreting the Gates totality of the cir-
cumstances approach are United States v. Kolodziej17 2 and United
States v. Sorrels. 17 In Kolodziej, three persons were arrested for
possessing large amounts of drugs; each of the three implicated
Kolodziej as his major supplier and each stated that Kolodziej kept
large amounts of money from drug sales in his automobile.1 74 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting Gates, held that the
search warrant was invalid because the tip provided nothing but
mere conclusions that the defendant was engaged in criminal activ-
ity and there was no basis of knowledge for the tip.1 75 The court
stated, however, that even absent some underlying facts from
which the informant could conclude that criminal activity was tak-
ing place, a finding of probable cause could still be warranted
under Gates if a strong showing of the informant's reliability is
the area. Twenty minutes later, the police received another anonymous call stating that
someone had tried to sell him two guns. This informant stated that the man was in a green
station wagon with a Maine license plate with a black truck in tow. It is not certain whether
both tips were from the.same informant. Id. at 45 & n.1.
168. Id. at 47.
169. Id. at 47-48.
170. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
171. Id. at 2330, 2333-36.
172. 712 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1983). Kolodziej was before the court on a petition for
rehearing in order for the court to reconsider its ruling in light of Gates. Id. at 976.
173. 714 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1983).
174. 712 F.2d at 976.
175. Id. at 977.
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made. 171 Concluding that there had been no showing of the inform-
ant's reliability or any police corroboration of the tips, the court
held there was no probable cause for the search warrant.17 7 The
court seemed to have assessed the information supplied in this
case as if the Aguilar-Spinelli test had never been abandoned by
using language similar to that of pre-Gates decisions.
178
Sorrels concerned the conviction of several men for firearms vio-
lations.1 79 Information was supplied by a confidential informant/
special employee who cooperated with the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms in a two-month investigation and posed as a
large-scale purchaser of firearms. 180 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, in interpreting Gates, stated that it is no longer necessary
for a magistrate to determine whether both prongs of Aguilar-
Spinelli have been satisfied; the focus, the court submitted, should
be on whether the constitutional rights of the party subjected to
the search will be violated if the warrant is issued. 81 In upholding
the warrant, the court stated that the affidavit was sufficiently de-
tailed although it did not relate the credibility of the informant.8 '
In deference to the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the court stated that it
did not recommend or endorse omissions in the affidavit of credi-
bility or reliability since the test in Aguilar-SpineUi has served
many useful purposes.18 3 The Sorrels court, while giving lip service
to the attributes of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, seems to have inter-
preted Gates as abandoning any de minimis requirements of that
test in favor of a test which assesses validity only upon whether
the constitutional rights of the party searched have been
infringed. 184
176. Id.
177. Id. at 977-78.
178. Id. at 977. The court used the following language:
Absent some of the underlying facts from which the informant concluded that
criminal activity had taken place, a finding of probable cause is nonetheless war-
ranted . . . if a strong showing regarding the informant's reliability is made. The
affidavit does not contain an affirmative allegation that any of the three informants
was known to be reliable. Nor does it state. . . that an independent police investiga-
tion corroborated the informant's tip.
Id.
179. See 714 F.2d 1522.
180. Id. at 1524-26.
181. Id. at 1528.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1528-29.
184. Id. at 1528. The court stated: "The focus of judicial inquiry should not be upon a
'grading of the paper' of the affiant, but rather; should be based upon whether the constitu-
tional rights of the party subject to the search will be violated if the warrants issue." Id.
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In the area of informants, named, unnamed or anonymous, it is
still entirely likely that confusion as to the amount of credibility to
be given such tips will continue. The area of probable cause is
fraught with judgmental decisions to be made by magistrates who
give different weight to different aspects of evidence. Aguilar-
Spinelli defined the minimum requirements of such tips when the
magistrate is confronted with an affidavit containing only hearsay
evidence.'85 Under Gates there seem to be no absolute minimum
requirements for such evidence. Gates determined that a magis-
trate may take into consideration any factor which may have a
bearing on probable cause,18 but the Gates majority did not indi-
cate whether this determination is to be subjective or objective.
Nor does Gates address the question of how much weight is to be
accorded other aspects of probable cause and hearsay. The Court
left open the question of whether greater weight is to be given to
the known reputation of the informant or the reputation of the
suspect, and the Court did not answer the question whether the
detail of the informant's tip is a better indication of reliability
than the informant's past accuracy.
Gates may represent the new de minimis requirements needed
for obtaining a search warrant, whatever they may be, or it may
simply indicate a change in the phraseology of the Court. No
longer may the courts use such terms as a substantial basis or rea-
sonable grounds; instead the new term will be the totality of the
circumstances.
As illustrated, it is likely that Gates will create more problems
than it will solve for the lower courts. If the two recent circuit
court decisions applying the totality of the circumstances approach
are any indication of the applicability of such a standard, it is in-
deed likely that this area will continue to be fraught with con-
torted evaluations of what constitutes probable cause. If Gates is
the definitive law in this area, police and magistrates will be una-
ble to predict with any degree of certainty what is required for
determinations of probable cause when hearsay evidence is in-
volved. It seems clear that other cases within this area will have to
be heard to address the unanswered questions in Gates and to de-
termine with some degree of certainty what is required for proba-
ble cause.
Megan E. Harmon
185. See supra notes 17 and 20.
186. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.

